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A large scale major CBRN incident may need cross-border and cross-professional engagement where efficient interoperability is vital. This research is the first EU consensus of a sociotechnical system map for CONOPS. It supports future research 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   I  n  t  e  r  n  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  J  o  u  r  n  a  l  o  f  E  m  e  r  g  e  n  c  y  S  e  r  v  i  c  e  s   Introduction When a mass casualty incident (MCI) related to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) agents occurs the emergency services will react rapidly to achieve the core goal of saving lives (Cornish, 2007; Alexander and Klein, 2003) . The response environment will probably be hazardous and ambiguous, with key information such as the cause of the incident (natural disaster, accident or terrorism), the contaminant (C, B, R or N), the numbers of injuries and fatalities, and the stability of the working situation (and risks to responders) likely to be unknown for a period of time. The emergency services (Fire, Police and Ambulance) will be working together in situations that are high risk and time critical, with different skill sets, training, and mental models (House et al., 2014; Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008, Drabek and McEntire, 2002; Mendonça et al. 2007 International co-operation is important for an effective response (Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, 2011) as, although "there is a low probability of these attacks their impact is so high that we judge preparations must be made for them.
As in so many other areas of this strategy those preparations must wherever possible be coordinated with our allies overseas" (Home Office, 2011) . One approach is to map the CBRN response as a sociotechnical system (STS; Carayon et al, 2015) . This is "a set of inter-related or coupled activities or entities (hardware, software, buildings, spaces, communities and people) (Salmon et al, 2012) . AcciMaps were originally developed to analyse STS interacting events and decision-making processes where there were opportunities for loss of control (and accidents; Branford et al., 2009) . Salmon et al (2012) commented that AcciMaps offer a good approach to represent organisation and individual interactions with multiple STS. This paper describes the development of a CBRN AcciMap as a STS (CONOPS) and future platform for development and evaluation of technology.
Method
The AcciMaps methodology was modified (Salmon et al, 2017) Purposive sampling was used to recruit participants to both provide relevant CONOPS documents and for interviews. As the content was sensitive and sometimes restricted, participants were recruited through project partners in the (anonymised) project. Participants were required to have experience of operating at Silver or Gold levels of command and have worked at Bronze level (Table 1) to allow exportation of all levels of the STS.
<Insert Table 1 here>
The development of the AcciMaps used an iterative qualitative approach with empirical data collection from document analysis and interviews. Documents, both open source (e.g. NATO, 2015) , and restricted (if access was approved), were read to extract task and operator information. These were separated by hierarchy (Gold to first responder) using the themes of communication, planning, action, and reflection to form the first AcciMap (Version 1; V1). This allowed visualisation of multiple tasks and responsibility levels on a single map, creating a preliminary framework. for integration into the maps. These data were used to develop V1 mapping with tasks allocated to hierarchies and categories as with the document analysis.
The V1 map was then reviewed with a participant from each stakeholder service (Fire, Ambulance, Police, and Military) exploring any differences between the written procedure (work as imagined) and actual procedures (work as done). The AcciMaps were amended following feedback to create version 2 (V2). This iterative process continued with AcciMaps sent for responder validation and feedback, until the AcciMap was signed off as an accurate representation of each service's CBRN response.
To create the harmonised consensus, the individual AcciMaps from each service were combined into a single AcciMap to represent the CBRN response STS across the EU. Each individual AcciMap was compared and contrasted to look for similarities (rather than differences). The development of the consensus AcciMap aimed to have less detail to manage differences between services but to retain sufficient detail as a usable STS model. The same iterative procedure was followed with review, feedback and validation to all participants (n=5). Every time the AcciMap was changed it was circulated to all participants to ensure that it retained validity for their individual service. This reduced the level of detail, for example tasks for triage and initial treatment can be undertaken by either Fire Service or a specialist Ambulance service depending on the territory, so the map does not assign tasks to one service. The EU AcciMap was validated by all participants as meaningful for their country.
Results
The essential tasks and operations of an EU CBRN response are shown as a harmonised (consensus) AcciMap (Figure 1 ) for the themes of Communication, Planning, Action, and Reflection. It was agreed that a similar structure of command 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The Gold/ Strategic Command is outward facing, managing the resources (regional, national and international) needed for the response. They are the point of contact with Government representatives and give or agree messages to the public, often via the media. They instigate the Strategic Plan (S-Plan) based on policies, legal frameworks and protocols which is used by the Incident Commander (IC). Gold/ Strategic Command will consider mutual aid plans, environmental considerations Fire services (BLR and S-BLR) are responsible for detecting, identifying and monitoring (DIM) hazards using a wide range of methods and equipment (technology). This information is used to determine cordons and zones, and communicated through the command levels to develop Strategic and Tactical Plans.
In most EU territories Fire services usually lead for triage and evacuation of nonambulatory casualties from the Hot Zone; they are also responsible for mass decontamination of casualties, using improvised and specialist systems depending on the location and phase of the CBRN event and available resources. In the UK the Ambulance service is responsible for clinical triage in the Hot Zone.
BLR tasks are supported or limited by the available equipment. Most Ambulance services (except UK) are not routinely supplied with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) which allows them to enter the Hot Zone, so pre-hospital care is mostly provided in the Cold Zone. Fire services usually carry higher specification PPE, including breathing apparatus, and will enter the Hot Zone to perform snatch rescues ('heavers') and initial reconnaissance. 
Scene management (isolated and controlled for the safety)
. This occurs at the BLR level with initial responders evacuating and securing the Hot Zone followed by the Police services taking charge of securing the area as soon as possible. DIM information is used by Fire Services to calculate the Hot, Warm and Cold Zone boundaries; it will be monitored throughout the incident for wind changes etc.
Saving and protecting lives -effective methods for rescue, decontamination
and medical treatment must be considered. This is done by BLR and S-BLR levels with snatch rescues, triage, treatment and decontamination. However, these tasks could be performed by difference services 4. Specialist support. This occurs at both Silver and Gold levels where contact information for specialists in chemicals, biological agents, radiological substances, environmental clean-up etc. will be in place and can be activated if necessary.
Opportunities for future technology development and evaluation were explored by locating specific technologies in individual sectors. For example, Fire service BLR 
Discussion
The international security expert community believe there is a growing probability for CBRN attacks (Steinhausler, 2015) . Alexander and Klein (2006) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Mendonça et al., 2007) . We suggest that the overview model approach taken in this paper may be as specific as is advised or needed for mapping CBRN response, as more specific operating procedures may not be achievable. However, segments of activity have been identified within the consensus AcciMap and are being further developed for use in planning/specification research and technology development, including field technical exercises.
It is acknowledged that the study has limitations in only featuring three EU countries (UK; Greece; and Finland). However, it received a very positive response when presented within the EU Community of Users in 2017 (https://www.securityresearchcou.eu/). Some caution should be used when generalising results and we recommend that further validation will be useful, as with most research.
Conclusion
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